Insider: Short of War

The Insurance Weapon: How Commercial Risk Logic Became an Irregular Warfare Tool at Hormuz

In this latest article, Dr. John George Hatzadony explores how the insurance weapon irregular warfare mechanism closed the Strait of Hormuz in 2026. This audio version details how commercial risk logic converts limited kinetic action into systemic economic disruption.
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Friendly Cyber Fire: How Much Did NotPetya Cost Russia?

In this episode, we explore the true cost of the NotPetya cyberattack—often labeled the most destructive cyber incident in history. While billions in damages affected companies worldwide, far less attention has been paid to the unintended consequences for Russia itself, the attack’s attributed origin. This episode walks through the economic data, methodology, and strategic implications of cyber “spillover,” revealing how offensive cyber operations can backfire in unexpected ways. Through careful analysis, we examine whether NotPetya meaningfully harmed Russia’s own economy—and what that means for the future of cyber warfare.

The Strategic Use of Drones in Pakistan–India Irregular Warfare

In this episode, we break down Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad’s analysis of India-Pakistan drone warfare, exploring how cheap precision and autonomous systems are rewriting the rules of the "grey zone". We discuss the fallout of the May 2025 crisis, the "cost-asymmetry" of modern defense, and whether these unmanned platforms are pushing nuclear-armed rivals toward a dangerous tipping point.
 

Arming Kurdish Resistance Fighters in Iran with Drones

In this episode, we examine how Kurdish resistance drones in Iran could transform the battlefield in an irregular conflict with the Iranian regime. Drawing lessons from Ukraine’s drone warfare and global insurgencies, the article explores how affordable unmanned systems could provide Kurdish resistance forces with air support, intelligence, logistics, and psychological leverage. The discussion also looks at how the United States, Israel, and regional partners could support such an effort through training, technology transfers, and drone procurement networks. Ultimately, the episode explores whether drone-enabled insurgency could shift the strategic balance in Iran.

Precision-Guided Predictions: Intelligence Risk in Prediction Markets

In this episode, we read Peter Burns' article on the intelligence risk in prediction markets. We explore how high-liquidity platforms like Polymarket democratize signal intelligence, potentially allowing individuals with inside knowledge to leak state intent. Tune in to hear about real-world examples, from Venezuela to Israel, where prediction markets compromised operational security.
 

China’s Digital Yuan and the Fight for Southeast Asia’s Financial Infrastructure

This episode analyzes China’s digital yuan as a tool for irregular warfare, exploring how Beijing’s state-controlled currency competes with Japan and South Korea’s stablecoin models for dominance over Southeast Asia’s financial infrastructure.
 

What I Learned from Being a Planner in an Advisory Command: Reflections from the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine

In this episode, we explore the unique challenges and adaptations of military planning within the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U). From shifting mission analysis priorities to the "Four Ways of Seeing" framework, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin C. Stumpf shares vital reflections on conducting advisory military planning in a complex environment without direct command and control over partner forces.
 

Northern Approaches: Finland, Sweden, and the Growing Opportunities for Allied Irregular Warfare

Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, prompted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has significantly bolstered the Alliance's capabilities, adding 15 million people and doubling the NATO-Russia land border to 1,584 miles. This development enhances irregular warfare (IW) opportunities, both defensively and offensively, by leveraging the Nordics' strong militaries, societal resilience, and geographic proximity to Russia. Defensively, Finland contributes a massive reservist force of up to 870,000 trained citizens, the Hybrid Center of Excellence for countering hybrid threats, and winter warfare expertise from its special operations forces. Sweden adds its Total Defence model, which prepares civilians through informational brochures, a specialized submarine fleet for Baltic Sea operations, and a robust defense industrial base producing advanced systems like the Gripen fighter jet.
Offensively, the Nordics' location creates dilemmas for Moscow, enabling NATO to threaten key Russian assets in areas like the Kola Peninsula and St. Petersburg while facilitating reinforcements and deterrence through flexible options involving special operations. This shift forces Russia to reallocate resources, stretching its military posture across a longer border and reducing focus on other fronts like Ukraine. While risking security dilemmas, these IW enhancements strengthen NATO's northern flank without necessitating large-scale escalations, turning what was once neutral territory into a strategic advantage for the Alliance.

American Samoa is America’s Strategic Hub in the South Pacific

American Samoa is a strategic hub in the South Pacific, yet its importance is often overlooked in U.S. defense planning. This episode explores how Pago Pago Harbor’s unique geography, rising Chinese influence, illegal fishing, and illicit trafficking intersect with America’s maritime security challenges. Drawing on history, regional geopolitics, and current infrastructure gaps, the episode makes the case for renewed U.S. investment, a permanent Coast Guard presence, and port modernization to secure vital sea lanes, protect U.S. maritime rights, and strengthen regional stability in an era of great power competition.

Schrödinger's Security Partner: The Paradox of Measuring Security Force Assistance

U.S. security force assistance is trapped in a “Schrödinger’s Cat” paradox: the very metrics used to measure partner military success distort reality and create the illusion of effectiveness. By relying on easily quantifiable indicators—troop numbers trained, equipment delivered, units certified—the U.S. incentivizes performative behavior by both advisors and partner forces, producing polished reports rather than durable institutions. Drawing on examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sahel, and even Ukraine, the authors show how tactical proficiency metrics routinely mask corruption, weak political legitimacy, and institutional fragility, leading to strategic failure despite apparent progress. They contend this problem has worsened under post-2017 assessment frameworks that treat security assistance as a linear, engineering problem rather than a complex adaptive system. The solution, they argue, is not abandoning assessment but redesigning it: shifting from proof-seeking to hypothesis-testing, elevating qualitative advisor judgment, measuring outcomes that partners cannot fake, and aligning evaluation with strategic competition rather than counterterrorism-era outputs—so that when a crisis finally “opens the box,” policymakers aren’t shocked to find a force that only ever looked alive on paper.