Insider: Short of War

Welcome to the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Insider: Short of War, where IWI transforms its thought provoking articles into compelling audio pieces. Our podcast bridges the gap between scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, offering in-depth analysis and expert commentary on the dynamic world of irregular warfare. Stay informed and engaged with the latest insights from leading voices in the field, right at your fingertips.

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Episodes

4 days ago

Explore how the PRC Grand Strategy AI model ("PRC-StrateGPT") uses artificial intelligence to decode Chinese strategy, with a case study of the Solomon Islands' geopolitical shift.

The UK’s New Take on Cyber

Tuesday Mar 04, 2025

Tuesday Mar 04, 2025

In this episode, we delve into the UK's evolving cyber power strategy, examining its cybersecurity policies, role in Great Power Competition, and approach to responsible cyber influence. From resilience to offensive cyber operations, we break down the nation's vision for digital sovereignty and global leadership in cyberspace.

Thursday Feb 27, 2025

In this episode, we examine how the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria is disrupting Iran’s irregular warfare strategy, weakening Hezbollah, and reshaping power dynamics across the Middle East.

Tuesday Feb 11, 2025

The US is falling behind China in naval power, making conventional deterrence strategies for Taiwan ineffective. In this episode, we explore an alternative military approach—one that sidesteps China's naval dominance and strengthens deterrence through irregular warfare and strategic presence. Tune in to understand why a new US military strategy for Taiwan is critical for maintaining regional stability.

Thursday Feb 06, 2025

In this episode, we explore Ukrainian SEAD operations and their impact on modern warfare. Learn how Ukrainian special operations forces have successfully targeted Russian air defenses and what this means for the future of U.S. and NATO SOF. Tune in for an in-depth analysis of tactics, strategies, and lessons from the frontlines.

Tuesday Feb 04, 2025

In today’s episode, we delve deep into the complexities of irregular warfare in the modern geopolitical landscape. With global tensions on the rise, from the Syrian conflict to the shifting power dynamics in Ukraine and beyond, this episode explores the need for an adaptive and layered U.S. strategy to navigate the "gray zone" of conflict. From proxy deterrence and economic warfare to combating disinformation, we unpack the principles that can empower U.S. policy and defense efforts without escalating into full-blown war. Join us as we explore the evolving challenges and the strategic responses needed to safeguard global stability.

Thursday Jan 30, 2025

n this episode, we dive into the evolving role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in Irregular Warfare (IW) and their growing impact on gray zone conflicts. USSOF’s adaptability, specialized skills, and focus on building resilient partnerships have made them pivotal in shaping regions and preempting threats—especially in conflicts like the ongoing war in Ukraine.
We explore how USSOF has been crucial in fostering resistance movements, from supporting Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian aggression through unconventional tactics, to the structural challenges they face in current U.S. Security Cooperation (SC) mechanisms. These mechanisms, while vital, are insufficient for supporting the expanding scope of USSOF operations. We delve into the shortcomings of existing funding and authority structures, such as Section 127d and the SSCI process, and propose a new, streamlined approach that would ensure USSOF’s continued agility and strategic success.
Join us as we analyze the intersection of policy, military strategy, and operational needs, and discuss how refining U.S. support for resistance-focused operations can enhance national security and global stability.

Tuesday Jan 28, 2025

In this episode, we delve into the historical and modern strategies for countering Russian occupation. From the guerrilla tactics of the Forest Brothers to lessons drawn from Ukraine's resistance, discover how multinational cooperation, emerging technologies, and pre-crisis planning can strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. Learn why resilience, innovation, and unity are critical to resisting occupation and safeguarding sovereignty in the face of aggression.

Thursday Jan 23, 2025

The Necessary Evolution of U.S. Grand Strategy: Learning from the Past to Address Modern Challenges in the Era of Strategic Competition by Doug Livermore
 
In an era of increasing global complexity and competition, the United States faces unprecedented challenges that require a fundamental reassessment of its grand strategy. As defined by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the role of grand strategy is, “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.” Examining historical approaches to national security should inform contemporary strategic thinking, all while acknowledging that modern threats demand innovative solutions that go beyond traditional frameworks. The transformation of the international system from a unipolar moment following the Cold War to today's multipolar reality necessitates a comprehensive reevaluation of American strategic priorities and approaches.
 
Historical Foundations: The Containment Strategy
 
The Cold War era's containment strategy, first articulated by George Kennan in his 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and later formalized in National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), represented a watershed moment in American strategic thinking. This comprehensive approach successfully constrained Soviet expansion through multiple interconnected mechanisms. The strategy established a robust military deterrent through the nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other regional alliances, thus creating a credible counter to Soviet military power. Simultaneously, it leveraged economic tools, including the Marshall Plan, to strengthen democratic allies and create a resilient international order. These efforts were complemented by sophisticated diplomatic initiatives to isolate the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact while building a coalition of democratic nations.
 
The success of containment demonstrated the effectiveness of patient, multi-dimensional engagement in achieving long-term strategic objectives. However, it is crucial to note that this success came at significant cost and required sustained commitment across multiple administrations. The strategy's effectiveness stemmed from its ability to align domestic resources, international partnerships, and strategic objectives in a coherent and sustainable manner. This alignment proved essential in maintaining American resolve through periods of intense crisis and relative calm.
 
The containment strategy's success also highlighted the importance of strategic communication in maintaining domestic and international support. Through various initiatives, including the United States Information Agency and Radio Free Europe, America effectively communicated its values and objectives to global audiences while countering Soviet propaganda. This aspect of the strategy provides valuable lessons for today's information environment, where the battle for narrative dominance has become increasingly crucial.
 
The Reagan Doctrine represented both an evolution and intensification of Kennan’s containment strategy, moving beyond mere constraint of Soviet influence to actively rolling back communist expansion through support to anti-communist forces worldwide. This more aggressive approach maintained containment's fundamental recognition of the need to integrate multiple instruments of national power, but significantly expanded America's willingness to provide overt military and economic support to insurgent forces in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Reagan's strategy paired this support for anti-communist proxy forces with a massive conventional military buildup, strengthening of key alliances, and promotion of free trade– demonstrating how discrete tactical actions could serve broader strategic aims.
The strategy's success in accelerating the Soviet Union's eventual collapse highlighted several enduring principles of effective grand strategy. First, it showed how supporting local partner forces could achieve strategic objectives at relatively low cost and risk to US forces. Second, it demonstrated the importance of aligning military, economic, and diplomatic efforts – as Reagan's military pressure was amplified by economic warfare and aggressive diplomacy. Third, it revealed how focusing on adversaries’ key vulnerabilities (in this case, the ) could force them to make strategic concessions. These lessons would later influence approaches to counterterrorism and great power competition, though the unique circumstances of the late Cold War meant that not all elements of the Reagan Doctrine would translate directly to future challenges.
 
The Evolution of Political Warfare
 
Modern great power competition has evolved beyond traditional military confrontation into a complex web of political warfare. Kennan's May 1948 memorandum on political warfare offered perhaps the clearest articulation of how great powers compete across all domains, defining it as "the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace." In his analysis, political warfare was fundamentally "the employment of all means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives." This understanding wasn't new–from the Monroe Doctrine to Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's emphasis on sea power as an economic and diplomatic tool, American strategists had long recognized that great power competition demands orchestration of all instruments of national power.
 
What has fundamentally shifted is not the multidomain nature of this competition, but rather the revolutionary impact of the information environment. While Kennan emphasized overt and covert measures across diplomatic, economic, and military domains–all backed by America's growing power–today's strategic environment is dominated by the unprecedented speed, scope, and accessibility of information. The digital revolution has transformed traditional concepts of political warfare, creating new vulnerabilities and opportunities in cyberspace while accelerating the pace of influence operations to a degree that would have been unimaginable during the Cold War.
 
Political warfare in the contemporary context encompasses a broad spectrum of activities and capabilities, from economic coercion and cyber operations to information manipulation and proxy conflicts. The digital revolution has transformed the nature of political warfare, creating new vulnerabilities and opportunities in cyberspace while accelerating the pace of information operations. Understanding and adapting to these changes is crucial for developing effective strategic responses to modern challenges.
 
Counterterrorism and the Islamic State: Lessons from Recent History
 
The Trump Administration's campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offers important lessons about the evolution of American strategy in the face of non-state threats. The approach demonstrated the importance of integrating conventional military operations with irregular warfare capabilities to create an effective counterterrorism framework. Much like with the Soviet “containment” approach, this strategy combined precision military operations with robust partner force development and the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of US national power, creating a sustainable approach to counterterrorism that acknowledged the limitations of purely military solutions. Throughout 2017 and 2018, I represented the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as part of the broader interagency team that drafted and then implemented the “Defeat ISIS” whole-of-government strategy, witnessing firsthand an outstanding example of an integrated national strategy.
 
That strategy highlighted the importance of operational flexibility and the need to adapt strategic approaches to local conditions. The success in degrading ISIS territorial control came through careful coordination of military pressure, diplomatic engagement with regional partners, and efforts to address underlying governance challenges. Most recently, I served as the deputy commander for our NATO Special Operations Advisory Group–Iraq throughout 2022, where we supported the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service in maintaining ever-increasing pressure on ISIS remnants following the destruction of its physical caliphate. These experiences provide valuable insights for addressing hybrid threats in other contexts, particularly in regions where state weakness creates opportunities for malign actors.
 
Contemporary Challenges: A Multi-Threat Environment
 
Today's strategic landscape presents a more complex set of challenges than either the bipolar Cold War environment or the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism. China represents the most comprehensive challenger to US interests, combining rapid military modernization with sophisticated economic statecraft through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), technological competition in critical areas, and information operations that challenge democratic narratives. Both the Trump and Biden administrations’ National Defense Strategies (NDS) listed China in the top tier of global competitors. Understanding China’s “Three Warfares” approach to strategic competition has become so important that my research on this topic is featured in the latest Army Doctrine Publication 3-13 (Information). China's strategic approach demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of how to leverage economic power for geopolitical advantage, while its military modernization presents increasingly significant challenges to American power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.  
 
Russia, despite economic limitations, also poses significant challenges to global stability and peaceful competition through military modernization, nuclear capabilities, hybrid warfare tactics, energy diplomacy in Europe, and sophisticated information warfare operations. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare, demonstrated in Ukraine and other theaters, highlights the importance of developing comprehensive responses to threats that blur traditional distinctions between war and peace. Iran continues to present regional challenges through its network of proxy forces, nuclear program development, cyber capabilities, and demonstrated resilience to economic sanctions. These diverse challenges require strategies that can address multiple threats simultaneously while maintaining strategic coherence.
 
The proliferation of advanced technologies has further complicated the strategic landscape. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous systems are transforming military capabilities and creating new vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the increasing importance of space and cyberspace as domains of competition requires new approaches to deterrence and conflict management.
 
Irregular Warfare in Strategic Competition
 
The modern security environment demands adaptation of irregular warfare capabilities to counter adversaries' gray zone activities while maintaining conventional deterrence. This requires developing sophisticated approaches to proxy warfare, information operations, and economic statecraft that can compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict. The challenge lies in integrating these capabilities into a coherent strategy that can address both immediate threats and long-term strategic competition.
 
Success in this environment requires developing new operational concepts that can effectively combine conventional and irregular capabilities. It also demands new approaches to partnership and coalition building that can sustain long-term competitive efforts while managing escalation risks. The role of special operations forces must evolve to address the full spectrum of modern conflict, from direct action to strategic influence operations.
 
Toward a New Grand Strategy
 
Addressing these diverse challenges requires a comprehensive approach to grand strategy, defined by Sir Basil Liddell Hart as directing all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object, looking beyond the conflict to the “subsequent peace.” Success demands the coordinated application of all elements of national power. In the diplomatic realm, this means strengthening existing alliances while building new partnerships, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. This includes revitalizing traditional alliances like NATO while developing new frameworks for diplomatic, economic, and informational cooperation.
The information domain requires sophisticated capabilities to counter disinformation while promoting democratic values, combining defensive measures against foreign influence operations with proactive efforts to shape the global narrative. This requires not only technical capabilities but also a sophisticated understanding of how to effectively communicate American values and objectives to diverse global audiences.
 
Military strategy must maintain conventional and nuclear deterrence while developing capabilities for “gray zone” competition, including investments in emerging technologies and expansion of unique capabilities. The challenge lies in balancing these various requirements while maintaining force readiness, deployment cycles, and modernization efforts.
 
Economic tools must be deployed strategically, combining targeted sanctions against adversaries with investment screening mechanisms, trade agreements that strengthen allies and build strong relationships, and technology controls in critical sectors. Emerging technologies must be central to strategic planning, with particular attention to artificial intelligence applications, quantum computing, space capabilities, and cyber tools for both defensive and offensive operations.
 
Institutional Reform and Implementation
 
Effective grand strategy requires institutions with reformed interagency coordination mechanisms and updated decision-making processes that match the speed of modern challenges. Success in modern conflict requires breaking down traditional institutional barriers and creating more agile organizational structures capable of responding to hybrid threats.
The current national security architecture, largely designed for the Cold War era, must be updated to address modern challenges. This includes developing new mechanisms for coordinating responses to hybrid threats, improving information sharing across agencies and with partners, and creating more effective processes for strategy development and implementation that are more akin to the Cold War era containment approach and my own experience with the successful Defeat-ISIS strategy.
 
Several significant implementation challenges must be addressed. Resource constraints require careful prioritization and sustained funding across multiple domains. Domestic political dynamics necessitate building consistent policy approaches that can survive transitions between administrations. Different threat perceptions and priorities among allies complicate coalition building, while technology management demands sophisticated regulatory frameworks that balance innovation with security.
 
Conclusion
 
The United States faces a strategic environment more complex than at any point in its history. Success requires learning from both the patient, multi-dimensional approach of containment and the agile, targeted nature of counterterrorism operations. However, these lessons must be adapted to address contemporary challenges.
 
A new American grand strategy must leverage all elements of national power while maintaining the flexibility to both address current threats while focusing on a desired future global security environment. Such a grand strategy, in addition to describing this preferred future state, must lay out the multidimensional processes, policies, and programs necessary to achieve that outcome across an extended time horizon. This requires institutional reform, technological innovation, and sustained commitment across multiple administrations. Most importantly, it demands recognition that in today's interconnected world, American security and prosperity are inextricably linked to global stability and America’s strength within the international order. However the US ultimately decides to shape the future, it will require a coherent grand strategy to make that future a reality.
 
The path forward requires not only new capabilities and approaches but also a renewed commitment to American leadership in the international system. This leadership must be based on a clear understanding of American interests and values, combined with a realistic assessment of the resources and capabilities required to achieve strategic objectives. Success in this endeavor will require sustained effort, strategic patience, and the ability to build and maintain effective coalitions in an increasingly complex global environment.

Tuesday Jan 21, 2025

During the final stretch of the 2024 American presidential election, the Department of Justice seized 32 web domains linked to ‘Doppelganger,’ an aggressive Russian disinformation campaign to influence American voters. Meanwhile, China has continued to exploit the US sanctions regime to promote its own currency, the renminbi, as a viable alternative to the dollar. And while wildfires and winter storms ravage expansive regions of the country—not long after Hurricanes Helene and Milton had exposed glaring deficiencies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) planning and budget—forecasters and politicians alike grapple with an increasingly grim future defined by extreme weather and climate change.
 
What do these challenges have in common? According to the siloed US national security enterprise, perhaps not much. But that assumption betrays a critical lack of vision. In reality, Americans are under siege every day, often by forces that they neither perceive nor understand. The United States is at war—not kinetically, but instead on the intangible battlefields of internet chat groups, currency exchanges, security cooperation agreements, and natural disaster responses. As the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) warns, the contemporary security environment is best described as an era of strategic competition and transnational crises. And the simultaneity of these challenges will be a defining feature of American foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century.
 
How should the US government conceive of this new “Great Game” in which it is uncomfortably enmeshed? How does one measure a state’s relative position in the ongoing geopolitical clash? And what does ‘winning’ mean in this environment? These questions serve as the primary impetus for Winning Without Fighting: Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century—a new book by Rebecca Patterson, Susan Bryant, Ken Gleiman, and Mark Troutman which establishes a holistic vocabulary and strategic framework for outcompeting America’s adversaries. In a modern era of ‘irregular’ challenges that often fall below the traditional threshold of armed conflict, the United States must employ a more expansive toolset of non-kinetic and cost-effective means, drawing upon American advantages and undermining enemy weaknesses.
 
Strategic Drift
Today’s threat landscape is daunting. A renewed era of strategic competition—featuring revisionist autocratic actors such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations—is at the forefront of national security concerns. But Winning Without Fighting also adopts the idea, which underpins the 2022 NSS, that the world has entered an “age of crises” or a “world of the polycrisis.” Indeed, the concurrent threats posed by the increasing (and often mutually-reinforcing) effects of climate change, health crises, mass migration, and the introduction of disruptive technologies will challenge the resilience of all national governments, consuming increasing amounts of economic and military power to counter them effectively. Experts may debate whether strategic competition or transnational crises pose the more significant problem, but the United States must manage both.      
 
However, America is strategically adrift. The US government, having failed to secure meaningful military success in any recent conflict, has determined the best way to succeed is to double down on preparing for a large-scale conventional operation while neglecting to recognize that its adversaries are already waging an asymmetric war using all instruments of power. As a result, America’s leaders often pursue a narrowly cast military-, technology-, and deterrence-centric strategy—instead of a more appropriate whole-of-society approach leveraging both kinetic and non-kinetic tools of military, economic, and information statecraft, as well as national resilience. At best, this flawed construct inadequately employs the necessary tools of competitive statecraft and produces suboptimal strategic outcomes; at worst, it could precipitate strategic defeat.
 
Strategic Culture
This dependence on overwhelming military force is rooted deep in American strategic culture. Relying on the work of Colin Gray and Tom Manhken, Winning Without Fighting argues that American strategic culture suffers from a binary conception of war and peace incompatible with the gray-zone style of competition in which it is currently enmeshed. This binary also extends to the definition of war itself, which Americans conceive of solely as military conflict—in contrast to the more holistic Chinese view of warfare, which also encompasses economic and informational competition, and to Russian strategic culture, which prefers authoritarian governance and strategic depth in the form of a well-controlled near abroad. And while military power remains necessary in a world that features a stalemated Russo-Ukrainian War and an escalating Middle East conflagration, it is not sufficient.
 
This strategic culture deeply affects the framing of national security issues in the policy discourse. Even when the government develops sound conceptual frameworks for competing below the threshold of war—such as “irregular warfare,” the “competition continuum,” and even “integrated deterrence”—these supposedly whole-of-society concepts are often solely or mostly led by the Department of Defense (DoD) rather than the interagency process. They often focus disproportionately on the role of applied violence rather than the large toolset of non-kinetic means at America’s disposal. Instead, the United States needs a more holistic strategic framework.
 
 
Irregular Warfare: The Ends
Winning Without Fighting advances irregular warfare (IW) as the concept that should guide US foreign and domestic policy in the 21st century. While every term is flawed, IW captures two essential areas of focus: 1) the ‘irregular’ nature of today’s competition, which should involve a greater reliance on non-kinetic means of competitive statecraft; and 2) the idea that such competition is indeed ‘warfare,’ even when it is waged non-kinetically, thereby instilling greater urgency and purpose into an American policy discourse that often neglects peacetime threats. Therefore, Winning Without Fighting arms policymakers, experts, and students with the vocabulary for addressing today’s challenges—if the threat landscape is marked by ‘strategic competition’ and an ‘era of crises,’ then the predominant domain will be the ‘gray zone’ between war and peace, where ‘irregular warfare’ must be the prevailing strategic concept.
 
So, what does IW look like? Winning Without Fighting articulates three relative ends that the United States should always aim to achieve to bolster its competitive standing while diminishing that of the adversary. First is power, or the ability to affect others’ behavior. This often involves coercive military and economic tools “to compel our enemy to do our will,” in the words of Carl von Clausewitz. Second is influence, or the ability to affect others’ perceptions. And third, is legitimacy, or the collective belief among a relevant population that a certain actor or action is rightful. Influence and legitimacy require a greater reliance on tools such as informational statecraft, which can shape leaders’ and populations’ views of facts and reality, and national resilience, which can bolster a government’s legitimacy among people under siege. To prevail in irregular warfare, the United States must pursue all three objectives simultaneously.
 
 
Irregular Warfare: The Means
While the United States must pursue the same long-term ends (power, influence, and legitimacy) as its adversaries, it should not use the same means. Autocracies like China and Russia have certain advantages, especially their ability to marshal state resources and control information. However, democratic states have advantages, too, including their economic vitality, more extensive networks of allies and partners, and the legitimacy of their political institutions. American strategies have traditionally neglected fundamental US advantages across the economic, informational, and resilience elements of statecraft. However, US IW strategies prevailed during the Cold War and could prevail again today. Winning Without Fighting develops the foundation for a more holistic strategic approach based on the purposive integration of all instruments of statecraft and the more balanced participation of the agencies that wield them, with a particular focus on non-kinetic means that can generate power, influence, and legitimacy.
 
The first set of tools is military statecraft. While the United States must continue investing in conventional and nuclear forces to deter great-power war, it also has a variety of non-kinetic tools that are too often underutilized. Ironically, the United States ‘wrote the book’ on non-kinetic military statecraft during the Cold War—using a variety of interpersonal tools (e.g., Key Leader Engagements and International Professional Military Education), organizational tools (e.g., Foreign Military Sales), and systemic tools (e.g., global force posture) to enhance military power, influence, and legitimacy among its allies and partners. These tools represent major advantages in IW struggles as adversaries seek to entice countries into their spheres of influence. Therefore, US military statecraft must be at the core of future IW efforts to combat enemy military and paramilitary threats worldwide while bolstering and expanding the American alliance architecture.
 
Second is economic statecraft. The academic literature and policy discourse often focus too much on sanctions and embargoes. However, American-led or -influenced economic institutions have been at the center of the global economy since the end of World War II, and the dollar is still the international currency of choice. Therefore, Winning Without Fighting chronicles the diverse economic tools available to American policymakers, dividing them into a useful typology of trade-based tools (e.g., boycotts and embargoes, import and export controls, and tariffs), capital-based tools (e.g., asset freezes, financial sanctions, and the provision or withdrawal of aid), and domestic policies (e.g., fiscal, monetary, and industrial policy).
 
Third is information statecraft. While the United States should never imitate its adversaries’ draconian manipulation of information, including mis- and disinformation campaigns, it has various advantages to leverage in this space. Information sharing (e.g., funding credible news outlets and promoting radio and TV broadcasting), international agreements on the right to information, and the prosecution of actors who perpetrate illegal information operations can help bring greater clarity and even truth to a murky information environment. And in more intense campaigns, infrastructure destruction—such as blocking internet access or targeting radio transmission towers—can help stall the adversary’s use of mis- and disinformation.
 
Lastly, Winning Without Fighting proposes the addition of a new instrument of national power: resilience, invoking the National Intelligence Council’s 2017 Global Trends report, which argues that “measuring a state’s resilience is likely to be a better determinant of success in coping with future chaos and disruption than traditional measures of material power alone.”  The tools of resilience and the agencies responsible for ensuring national resilience (e.g., FEMA, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) have traditionally existed outside the national security sphere. But today, these agencies and their capabilities are critical for defending and advancing power, influence, and legitimacy. The states likely to prevail in IW are those capable of withstanding and mitigating severe shocks like climate change, pandemic disease, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. Therefore, resilience must be a priority for every presidential administration regardless of political party. But unlike other proposals for a “a grand strategy of resilience,” or one “based on resilience,” the authors of Winning Without Fighting emphasize that resilience is one element of a broader, more holistic approach.
 
However, it is not enough to employ these means. Good strategies are always flexible, adaptable, and robust, and thus policymakers must be able to assess their progress toward the overall ends over long time horizons. Winning Without Fighting develops a matrix of different military, economic, information, and resilience metrics, relating them to power, influence, and legitimacy, respectively. It also encourages the development of a more formal government-wide measurement framework and a culture of assessment to ensure that any IW strategy is meeting its goals.
 
Educating the Next Generation
Irregular warfare is not a battle or campaign—it is a long-term, multi-generational struggle. Winning Without Fighting not only articulates a strategic framework for current policymakers but also builds a common vocabulary for future decision-makers. It is a comprehensive primer for anyone interested in exploring America’s history, preferences, and outlook concerning IW, and it is meant to help students and practitioners alike reframe their thinking about strategic competition and America’s place in global politics. As we enter 2025, this strategic framework should guide important upcoming decisions on military competition, trade wars, countering harmful narratives, and combating dangerous transnational crises. 

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