Insider: Short of War

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group
 
by Dalton T. Fuss, a US Army Special Forces Officer, and Nakissa P. Jahanbani, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan War Commission, as a part of Project Proxies and Partners
 
This essay, the first installment of a two-part series, examines successful US counterstrategies against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Russian Wagner Group. It focuses on two key approaches: leveraging open-source intelligence to expose these organizations' structures and operations, and utilizing direct military force when necessary. The authors highlight the similarities between these state-affiliated non-state actors, their methods of operation, and the challenges they pose to US interests. By analyzing these successes, the article provides valuable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and intelligence officials dealing with similar threats in regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The piece emphasizes the importance of adaptability, innovation, and coordinated efforts across various instruments of national power in effectively countering these shadowy organizations, while also noting the ongoing challenges the US faces in presenting a unified front against such adversaries. This first part sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the topic in the subsequent installment.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
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Autonomous Ghosts are Reshaping Irregular Warfare and Maritime Security

Autonomous Ghosts are Reshaping Irregular Warfare and Maritime Security
by Laurel Baker the 2024 Rising Expert on Geostrategy in the Rising Experts Program at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy in collaboration with the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Project Maritime. Baker works for the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as a National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellow.
 
Laurel Baker explores the emerging threat of unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs) and their profound impact on irregular warfare and international security. Baker examines how these autonomous systems are reshaping naval strategy, challenging traditional maritime force compositions, and complicating the attribution of aggression at sea. She delves into the vulnerabilities of critical underwater infrastructure, particularly undersea cables, and how UMVs could be used for surveillance and sabotage. The piece discusses recent incidents involving UMVs, from Russian mapping operations to Houthi attacks, highlighting the lowered barriers to entry in maritime conflicts. Baker also addresses the legal and operational challenges posed by UMVs, including gaps in maritime law and difficulties in enforcement. The essay concludes by considering the implications for naval powers like the United States, suggesting the need for both defensive and offensive UMV capabilities, as well as regulatory reforms to address this new frontier in maritime security. Throughout, Baker emphasizes the dual nature of UMVs as both potential threats and valuable assets in the evolving landscape of naval warfare.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
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Uprooting the Enemy: A New Paradigm for Irregular Warfare Analysis

Uprooting the Enemy: A New Paradigm for Irregular Warfare Analysis
by Nicholas Krohley founder of Frontline Advisory. This article and accompanying report are a part of Project SOF in Competition. The report titled Integrated Understanding: Re-Thinking the Human Environment of Military Operations, is the first of the Irregular Warfare Initiative's occasional paper series.
 
Nicholas Krohley argues for the professionalization of analytical approaches in irregular warfare. He contends that while the U.S. has emphasized irregular warfare as an operational activity, it has neglected to develop a robust, systematic understanding of the environments where such warfare occurs. Krohley critiques past analytical shortcomings in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, highlighting how limited frameworks led to strategic failures. He proposes institutionalizing a more comprehensive analytical foundation for irregular warfare, suggesting the development of standardized products like a "Root Map" to better understand adversaries within their operational contexts. This approach, Krohley asserts, would integrate enemy-centric intelligence with broader environmental factors, potentially enhancing the design, execution, and evaluation of irregular warfare campaigns across the competition continuum.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
 
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Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale
by Beau Chapman, Alexander Suster, and Steven Ahart from the University of Texas Austin's Global Disinformation Lab in collaboration with the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Project Air and Space Power.
 
Burma's military junta, in its desperate bid to maintain power, has embarked on a complex and controversial journey into the world of drone warfare. From ambitious domestic production plans to covert international dealings, the regime's quest for aerial supremacy reveals a stark tale of grandiose dreams colliding with harsh realities. This deeply researched exposé traces the evolution of Burma's drone program, uncovering collaborations with China, Russia, and potentially Iran, while highlighting the junta's pivot to smaller, more practical drone solutions in the face of ongoing civil strife. As the military adapts its tactics, equipping commercial drones with locally manufactured bombs, the piece illuminates not only Burma's internal struggles but also the wider implications for regional stability and global efforts to control drone proliferation. Ultimately, this analysis offers critical insights into the challenges of regulating emerging military technologies and the potential for their misuse by authoritarian regimes.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
 
Until next time,
 
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Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning

Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning
In this essay, James P. Micciche, a US Army Strategist, presents a comprehensive framework for improving security cooperation planning and execution in support of U.S. defense strategy. He proposes three interconnected models: one that emphasizes clearly defined objectives tied to policy goals, another that focuses on understanding the operating environment with particular attention to partner nations' capabilities and institutions, and a third that advocates for developing campaigns of integrated, coordinated, and sequenced efforts. Micciche argues that by implementing these models, the United States can better leverage its network of allies and partners as a strategic advantage, aligning with the goals of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The essay underscores the importance of moving beyond discrete security cooperation activities to a more holistic, campaign-oriented approach that maximizes limited resources and accounts for wide-ranging effects in an era of strategic competition.
The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
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The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors

 
The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors
This episode explores the often-overlooked legitimacy of violent non-state actors and its implications for international security. We delve into how insurgent groups gain support from local populations and why current approaches to countering them often fall short. Our experts discuss case studies from ISIS to African separatist movements, offering insights on how democracies can more effectively address the root causes of insurgencies in an era of great power competition.
About the Authors:
Santiago Stocker is a Program Director at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and previously served as a Director in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The thoughts expressed in this piece are his own.
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and is a 2024 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint production of Princeton's Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point. The thoughts expressed in this piece are her own.
 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 
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The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces

By Antonio Salinas
 
The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces
Antonio Salinas offers a unique perspective on the collapse of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Through his "Cacti and Grass" analogy, Salinas illustrates how the U.S. attempted to cultivate a Western-style security force in an environment fundamentally unsuited for such structures. Drawing from his personal experiences and extensive research, Salinas examines the cultural mismatches, strategic oversights, and socio-political realities that contributed to the ANDSF's rapid disintegration. This insightful analysis not only sheds light on the complexities of the Afghanistan conflict but also offers valuable lessons for future foreign security assistance efforts.
 
Antonio Salinas is an active duty Army lieutenant colonel and PhD student in the Department of History at Georgetown University, where he focuses on the history of climate and conflict. Following his coursework, he will teach at the National Intelligence University. Salinas has twenty-five years of military service in the Marine Corps and the United States Army, where he led soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of Siren’s Song: The Allure of War and Boot Camp: The Making of a United States Marine.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 
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Irregular Warfare at Sea: Using Privateers To Seize Chinese Commerce

by Christopher Booth
Editor’s Note I: This article is part of IWI’s Project Maritime, a series exploring the intersection of irregular warfare and the modern maritime dimension. Focusing on current events and their underlying geographical and historical patterns, we aim to contextualize the drivers of conflict in the maritime domain and inspire dialogue on integrated statecraft approaches. We warmly invite your participation and engagement. Please send submissions to Submit An Article with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission.” Follow us @proj_maritime and check out our Project Maritime Look Book.
Editor’s Note II: IWI is pleased to announce Christopher Booth and Walker Mills as the new directors of Project Maritime. Their extensive expertise in irregular warfare, national security, and the maritime domain will significantly enhance our ability to provide unique insights into contemporary maritime challenges. Both Chris and Walker have been non-resident fellows and have written extensively for IWI in the past. We're thrilled to have them join IWI and Project Maritime in leadership roles.
In response to China's growing maritime power and America's naval vulnerabilities, Christoper Booth proposes a controversial solution: reviving privateering. He argues that employing private actors to raid Chinese commerce could provide an asymmetric advantage in a potential long-term conflict, addressing US shipbuilding deficiencies and exploiting China's reliance on maritime trade. Drawing parallels with historical precedents and recent irregular warfare tactics, the essay explores the legal and ethical considerations of privateering while challenging conventional thinking on naval strategy. This provocative proposal aims to spark discussion on innovative approaches to maritime warfare in the 21st century.
About the Author: Christopher D. Booth is a non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative and co-director of Project Maritime. He has more than two decades of experience in national security and international relations, first serving on active duty as an Army armor and cavalry officer. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Command and Staff College–Marine Corps University and graduated from Vanderbilt University Law School and the College of William and Mary.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 

Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran

Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran
 

In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern.
 
However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order.
 
Strategic Cybersecurity Alliances
 
State-sponsored malicious cyber actors from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran increasingly dominate the cyber threat landscape and are driven by geopolitical, economic, and military objectives. Moreover, adversaries develop capabilities for strategic ends, blurring the line between irregular and conventional warfare in cyberspace. Importantly, their efforts are not strictly unilateral, as evidence increasingly points toward formal and informal collaboration among rogue states in cyberspace. For example, Chinese and Russian cyber actors have been known to share malware and exploit kits, enabling more sophisticated attacks. Additionally, joint operations, like coordinated disinformation campaigns, have been observed, highlighting our adversaries’ willingness to coordinate influence operations.
 
Furthermore, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran also leverage emerging technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI) and generative AI, to enhance their cyber capabilities. Disruptive technologies can enhance already sophisticated cyber operations and allow for automated attacks, deep-fakes, and advanced social engineering tactics. AI in cyber operations poses new challenges for cybersecurity defenders as it increases the complexity, scale, and pace of potential attacks. How these nations use cyber capabilities, and leverage asymmetric advantages for strategic ends, underscores the need for greater international cooperation and more robust policy coordination to counter these irregular threats.
 
People’s Republic of China
 
China's journey toward becoming a cyber power began in the early 2000s. At the helm is the Central Commission for Cybersecurity and Informatization (CCCI), chaired by President Xi Jinping, as well as the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Cyberspace Administration of China. The “Great Firewall of China” exemplifies China’s commitment to information control, both domestically and internationally, and allows government control over the internet and information. By limiting domestic information access, the government controls the population’s understanding of other nations and restricts external access to Chinese-focused content, sites, etc.
 
A key component of China's cyber strategy is the concept of military-civil fusion, which encourages collaboration between the private sector and military and integrates resources. The fusion is evident in the activities of major Chinese tech firms like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent, which play significant roles in advancing China's cyber ambitions and provide irregular approaches to securing technological control over an increasing percentage of the world’s telecommunications and digital infrastructure outside China.
 
China's cyber strategy is also characterized by its use of state-sponsored hacking groups to conduct widespread and far-reaching cyber espionage and sabotage campaigns. The discovery of Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group, and its activities underscores China's focus on gaining asymmetric advantage over the US and its allies by gaining persistent access to their critical infrastructure. The group uses the unconventional and irregular warfare tactic of “living off the land,” utilizing existing resources in the operating system of the targeted devices and systems rather than introducing new files that could trigger cybersecurity sensors or be more easily detected through forensic analysis. Volt Typhoon's objective appears to be long-term persistence within the target environment, or pre-positioning, giving China the placement and access to conduct future acts of sabotage and disruption.
 
Russian Federation
 
Russia's evolution as a cyber power began in the late 1990s and early 2000s and is encapsulated in initiatives like, the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Russia's cyber strategy is deeply rooted in the concept of political warfare and its understanding of cyberspace as a theater of military operations akin to land, sea, air, and space. However, political warfare for Russia includes a cognitive dimension that influences how they leverage cyberspace to achieve political outcomes. Russia’s approach to cyberspace, therefore, differs from the concepts espoused by US and other NATO-aligned nations and is characterized by a decentralized and asymmetric approach to cyber operations.
 
The Russian government views cyberspace as a critical domain for exerting influence and achieving geopolitical goals and their cyber ecosystem is a complicated tangle of state and non-state actors. The Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation all have cyber units that conduct operations domestically and internationally. These agencies also recruit cybercriminals to carry out operations on their behalf, providing them with legal protection and resources in exchange for their services.
 
A key component of Russia's cyber strategy is the concept of information confrontation, an approach that integrates cyber operations, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and traditional military operations to achieve strategic objectives. Russia has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. For instance, Russian cyber actors have been implicated in attacks on US election systems, energy grid, water systems, and other critical sectors. The operations are designed to foster instability, leveraging cyber operations, cyber espionage, influence campaigns, and other asymmetric tactics as force multipliers in geopolitical conflicts.
 
Furthermore, Russia has a long history of integrating cyber operations into its broader military strategy, relying on cyber capabilities during conflicts, like its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The integration of cyber operations into Russia's broader political warfare framework, reminiscent of Soviet-era "active measures," further complicates attribution and response measures. Importantly, Russia’s approach to leveraging cyber operations and capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, spread disinformation, and conduct espionage underscores its asymmetric and irregular approach to confrontation with Western powers.
 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
 
North Korea's growth as a cyber power also began in the early 2000s and is largely focused on leveraging its cyber capabilities to circumvent economic sanctions and finance its regime through illicit means. Directing North Korea’s cyber activity is its Reconnaissance General Bureau, with “Bureau 121” being responsible for conducting cyber espionage, financial theft, and disruptive cyberattacks. However, North Korea’s cyber capabilities are divided among several units, including the now-infamous Lazarus Group, Kimsuky, and APT37, known for their sophisticated cyber operations.
 
North Korea's cyber strategy seeks to develop defensive and offensive capabilities. On the defensive side, North Korea has invested heavily in protecting its critical infrastructure and sensitive data from cyberattacks. On the offensive side, North Korea has developed various capabilities to conduct cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and disruptive cyberattacks.
 
North Korea has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. One of the most notable North Korean cyber operations is the 2014 Sony Pictures hack but the most significant is likely the 2017 WannaCry ransomware. WannaCry ransomware infected more than 200,000 computers in over 150 countries, causing widespread disruption by encrypting files on infected computers and demanding ransom payments in cryptocurrency. The attack is an example of North Korea's ability to conduct large-scale disruptive cyber operations and the regime's willingness to engage in asymmetric and irregular attacks to fund its government.
 
Islamic Republic of Iran
 
Iran's cyber proliferation began after the Stuxnet attack in 2010, an attack that targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Stuxnet highlighted the vulnerability of Iran’s critical infrastructure to foreign intervention and pushed the regime to invest heavily in developing cyber capabilities. As a result, Iran's cyber strategy has been focused on retaliatory cyber capabilities and driven by its perception that it is engaged in an ongoing conflict with the West over its nuclear program and other geopolitical issues. Unlike China and Russia, which primarily engage in cyber espionage, or North Korea, which engages in cybercrime and theft, Iran’s regime views cyber operations as a means of retaliating against sanctions and other forms of pressure from the international community.
 
Similar to North Korea, Iran's cyber strategy focuses on the development of defensive and offensive capabilities. On the defensive side, Iran has invested in protecting its critical infrastructure and sensitive data from cyberattacks and crafted defensive cyber doctrine to guide how the regime repels and mitigates cyberattacks against Iran. Offensively, Iran has developed various capabilities to conduct cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and disruptive cyberattacks.
 
Iran’s focus on retaliatory capabilities makes them a particularly volatile cyber actor, that is willing and able to launch disruptive attacks with little warning. For example, a significant Iranian cyber operation was Operation Ababil, which disrupted services at US financial institutions through a series of distributed denial-of-service attacks between 2011 and 2013. The Iranian hacking collective, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, carried out the attacks and is believed to be state-sponsored. The operation was designed to impact major US banks and is understood as the regime’s retaliation against economic sanctions.
 
To date, Iran has been implicated in numerous cyber espionage and disruptive activities targeting both governmental and private sector entities worldwide. The Shamoon attack, which targeted Saudi Aramco in 2012, is among the most notable Iranian cyber operations. The attack used malware to cause irreparable damage to thousands of computers, rendering them useless by overwriting the master boot record, partition tables, and most files with random data. Shamoon demonstrated Iran's ability to conduct large-scale destructive cyberattacks and highlighted its willingness to use asymmetric attacks to achieve strategic goals.
 
Implications for Global Security
 
China's, Russia's, North Korea's, and Iran's collaborative and individual cyber strategies have significant implications for global security. Their activities undermine the stability provided by NATO and Western powers, posing complex, asymmetric, and irregular challenges to international norms and, more broadly, cybersecurity. State-sponsored cyber operations, like state-sponsored terrorism or political violence, are sophisticated attempts to erode trust in digital infrastructure and government or institutional functions by disrupting the integrity, availability or confidentiality of data, services, and other aspects of online and physical security. For example, China's cyber activities, including Volt Typhoon, have heightened tensions with the US, particularly over Taiwan. Similarly, Russian cyber operations have exacerbated conflicts in the former Soviet Bloc nations and strained relations with Western nations.
 
The cyber collaboration between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran varies in scope; however, its aim always aligns with political goals that negatively impact the existing rules-based world order. For example, Russia leverages malware to attack Ukraine, which was developed by Scarab, a Chinese government-linked cyber group, and shares techniques on how best to leverage AI for attacking targets and “living off the land” persistence to avoid detection by cyber defenders.
 
Moreover, the cyber strategies' collaborative and sophisticated characteristics pose significant challenges for cybersecurity defenders. Traditional cybersecurity measures are often insufficient to counter the advanced tactics used by state-sponsored actors. NATO and Western powers must adopt a comprehensive approach that includes enhancing defensive capabilities, leveraging advanced technologies, fostering international cooperation, and developing offensive cyber strategies to effectively counter these threats. By doing so, they can safeguard the stability and security that have been our world's cornerstone since World War II's end.
 
Evan Morgan is the Founder of Cyber Defense Army, a cybersecurity consultancy and services firm that incorporates geopolitical risk in their cybersecurity practices for clients. He is a United States Air Force veteran.
 
Editor's note: This article is part of Project Cyber, which explores and characterizes the myriad threats facing the United States and its allies in cyberspace, the information environment, and conventional and irregular spaces. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event environment. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University's Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 
Capt. Taiwan Veney, cyber warfare operations officer, watches members of the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group in the Hunter's Den at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, MD, June 3, 2017. (U.S. Air Force photo by J.M. Eddins Jr.)
 
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Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific

Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific
Published July 25th, 2024
By Brandon Tran
“During the progress of hostilities, guerillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army… There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.”
-On Guerilla Warfare, by Mao Zedong
The expulsion of former Chinese defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 2024, is the latest development in a months-long series of personnel purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As President Xi Jinping continuously reforms the PLA to make it a “world-class military” capable of achieving the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) national security objectives, these purges illustrate an underlying tension that stems from competing priorities. Because the PLA is the armed wing of the CCP, Xi Jinping must make tradeoffs in balancing regime loyalty and military competence when selecting PLA officers for senior positions. As a result of this and similar compromises, the PLA remains unprepared for direct confrontation with near-peer adversaries. To address this gap, China will continue leveraging irregular warfare activities to incrementally accomplish its strategic objectives while buying time to achieve the level of conventional force development it desires. This article will evaluate how China’s use of irregular warfare sets the stage for its conventional force development, given the context of the competing requirements for senior PLA officer promotion, the PLA’s guiding principles, and the role of the new defense minister, Dong Jun.
Loyalty and Experience within the CMC
By necessity, Xi Jinping’s selection of senior officials balances political loyalty with operational and command experience. While he favors aggressive and competent commanders capable of realizing his ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, these leaders must remain politically loyal to Xi’s rule. His selections for the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2022 attest to this. In order of rank, they are Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu (who has since been removed), Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Xi’s appointment of senior leaders to the CMC  indicates  an attempt to balance loyalty and experience because many of his selections break precedent. Examples include Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, both promoted despite Zhang being past retirement age and Liu being the youngest in his rank group. These exceptions to policy were made because both Zhang and Liu have combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese border wars, a rare and valuable quality given that the PLA is largely untested and inexperienced in combat. In other unconventional moves, He Weidong was permitted to skip key career milestones before assuming his position on the CMC. At the same time, Miao Hua transitioned from a long Army career to become the Navy’s political commissar. Indeed, selection to senior leadership positions has also been based on personal connections and previous experience with Xi. He Weidong and Miao Hua worked with Xi back when he was a provincial official in Fujian, and both Zhangs hail from the same region as Xi, claiming membership in his infamous Shaanxi Gang.
Chinese Strategic Concepts
To put Xi’s priorities and the PLA’s irregular military operations into context, it is vital to understand the guiding principles that inform the PLA’s military philosophy. Since its founding, the PRC has adhered to a warfighting philosophy of Active Defense. Under this principle, conflict is believed to exist on a spectrum ranging from peace to kinetic war. As a result, the PLA assumes a proactive force posture, constantly assessing potential threats and carrying out activities below the threshold of kinetic war that could create a better geopolitical position for the PRC. Through Active Defense, the PLA would theoretically be able to accomplish its objectives while controlling escalation on the conflict continuum. 
In tandem with Active Defense is the concept of People’s War, incorporating lessons from the past century and a half and forming the backbone of the PLA’s tactics and strategies. From its inception by Mao during the Chinese Civil War to the present day, the idea of People’s War has gone through several revisions, but the crux remains the same. Warfighting proficiency must be pursued through all possible means at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The United States understands this in the modern context as being able to field a proficient joint force capable of combined arms and multi-domain operations.
However, due to having to include party loyalty as a prerequisite for promotion, the PLA suffers from an acute “Big Army Mentality” that prevents the realization of an effective joint force. Consider the service component composition of the 2022 CMC. Four of these officials are PLA Army officers, a Navy officer, and a Rocket Force officer, with no Air Force representation in the CMC. Because of the pervasive attitude in the PLA that favors the dominance of land forces, the PLA has struggled to integrate its different services, preventing it from executing seamless multi-domain operations in both war and peacetime. Wargames conducted by Chinese military leaders have shown that the PLA is not yet ready to face near-peer adversaries in conventional warfare. PLA publications and training orders frequently acknowledge these shortcomings, using phrases like the “Five Incapables,” “Two Incompatibles,” and “Three Whethers” to describe issues of inflexibility, poor training performance, and a general lack of readiness.
As a result of these weaknesses, and despite the PLA’s many modernization initiatives in recent years, the PLA still favors asymmetrical approaches and remains hesitant to embrace large-scale combat operations fully. This is best explained by the Chinese military concept of shi (勢), rendered in English as a “strategic configuration of power.” Under this framework, one’s military assets are arrayed to create an advantageous situation and physical power is applied at that particular moment to achieve victory. Returning to Active Defense and People’s War, shi (勢), when applied, would craft an unassailable position for the PLA and enable it to maximize its resources if conflict escalates to kinetic war. The PLA employs irregular tactics to create favorable geopolitical and battlefield conditions to achieve this objective, maximizing China’s strengths and neutralizing enemy advantages before conflict begins.
Irregular Warfare Activities
As military reforms continue, China will likely employ unconventional methods to achieve immediate security objectives. Recognizing its forces are not yet war-ready, China keeps tensions below the threshold for war through gray zone activities. The PLA uses warfighting, military deterrence, and military operations other than war to build capabilities and gather information, aiming to discourage adversaries or decisively defeat them if conflict arises. These activities are expected to intensify once military reforms and modernization are complete.
This strategy is already on display in the South China Sea. There, China optimizes anti-access and area-denial capabilities to prevent any significant and sustained challenge to Beijing’s territorial claims, all while remaining under the threshold for kinetic conflict. Components of this strategy consist of technological development, legal warfare, and expansion of China’s presence through manufactured islands.
Technological development in key areas of the maritime domain is intended to negate the West's advantages of firepower and experience to ensure Beijing’s dominance over other Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea. Legal warfare limits the range of potential responses to China’s actions by its adversaries yet still achieves PRC interests. Expanding China’s presence in the adjacent seas through conventional troop deployment and unconventional state entities ensures the persistence of Chinese influence. It enables China to continue its regional operations without escalating to war. All these activities require significant planning and expertise to function as intended and synchronize with other PLA activities, thus necessitating leadership with joint experience and knowledge.
The PRC bolsters its sea claims through conventional and unconventional means. Troop deployments and exercises, as well as the construction of artificial islands and commercial sea vessels, ensure a continuous Chinese presence that is hard for other maritime states to displace. These artificial islands provide strategic bases for sustainment and defense, which are crucial for sectoral control in naval warfare. Coupled with advances in military technology, this enables China to project its reach beyond the First Island Chain, effectively limiting the entry of other navies into the area.
The China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Maritime Militia are key in these irregular activities. Their vast number of assets and plausible deniability, under the guise of internal security, offer significant advantages. CCG and Maritime Militia vessels often target other ships with non-lethal means, preventing competing states from establishing a sustained maritime presence in the South China Sea while minimizing the risk of military escalation. The PRC frequently obstructs and evades attempts to enforce international law about maritime practices. This enables China to act with impunity in the South China Sea and provides the PRC the time and space to consolidate its claims within the Nine Dash Line. Again, these gray zone activities require considerable expertise and experience to avoid escalating tensions beyond China’s readiness.
The New Defense Minister
Further evidence that the PLA will continue to execute gray zone activities can be found in the appointment of the new Minister of Defense. On December 29, 2023, China announced the appointment of the PLA Navy (PLAN) commander Dong Jun as its new defense minister. Dong Jun previously served as the deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, responsible for Taiwan Strait maritime issues and disputed islands in the East China Sea. After that, Dong was deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command, which oversees operations in the contested South China Sea. His operational experience in these strategically vital theater commands handling China’s most salient national security interests already makes him a desired candidate for promotion by conventional force standards alone.  Dong Jun also has extensive experience conducting gray zone activities because such operations are largely carried out by the PLA Navy and conducted in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands’ areas of responsibility.
Also of note is the fact that Dong Jun is not sanctioned by the United States, unlike his predecessor, which suggests that he will be able to serve China effectively in military diplomacy. Dong’s recent engagements with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin illustrate the role he is stepping into. These are the first of such meetings in over two years and reflect attempts to ease tensions between the two countries. Thus, Dong Jun’s promotion facilitates diplomatic engagement and enables China the time and space to develop conventional military capabilities and bring China’s military power to the immediate forefront. Military diplomacy reduces threat perceptions, preventing escalation along the continuum of conflict and enabling China to continue its activities in repositioning and improving the PLA.
Conclusion
Since the PLA is not ready for a direct confrontation, China will continue to bide its time and leverage gray zone activities to achieve its interests while preparing the PLA to be able to counterbalance any potential near-peer adversary. To this end, we should expect to see increased use of irregular warfare, coercion, and pressure in the maritime domain from the China Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, especially given the elevation of Admiral Dong Jun to the position of defense minister. With these developments, the PLA will step closer to towards its goal of being able to execute unified multi-domain operations. The United States and its partners must also prepare for the future challenges to come. 
Brandon Tran is a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is majoring in International Affairs and Chinese.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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