Insider: Short of War

Call for Submissions: Policy Recommendations for the New Administration

By Tobias Bernard Switzer, the Editorial Director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative
 
When a new American president takes office on January 20th, they will confront a dangerous national security environment shaped by Irregular Warfare (IW) challenges. From cyber warfare and gray zone conflicts to terrorism and insurgency, these challenges demand immediate, actionable solutions.
The Irregular Warfare Initiative invites you to contribute fresh, pragmatic, and non-partisan policy recommendations to help shape the next administration’s approach to these threats. We welcome contributions from practitioners, policymakers, and academics alike.
 
The announcement and further details can be found at this link.
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Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular

Boxing with Shadows: Drawbacks in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group

by Dalton T. Fuss, a US Army Special Forces Officer, and Nakissa P. Jahanbani, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan War Commission, as a part of Project Proxies and Partners
 
This essay examines the shortcomings in U.S. strategies against the Wagner Group and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It highlights two key issues: these groups' ability to operate in obscure regions with little scrutiny, and the U.S. government's poor coordination of its national assets. The authors argue that adversaries like Russia and Iran employ more cohesive approaches combining soft and hard power, while the U.S. struggles with a fragmented strategy. They call for improved inter-agency coordination, increased international awareness, and a multifaceted approach to counter these groups' influence in vulnerable regions.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group

Shining a Light: Highlighting Successes in US Counterstrategies Against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Russian Wagner Group
 
by Dalton T. Fuss, a US Army Special Forces Officer, and Nakissa P. Jahanbani, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan War Commission, as a part of Project Proxies and Partners
 
This essay, the first installment of a two-part series, examines successful US counterstrategies against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Russian Wagner Group. It focuses on two key approaches: leveraging open-source intelligence to expose these organizations' structures and operations, and utilizing direct military force when necessary. The authors highlight the similarities between these state-affiliated non-state actors, their methods of operation, and the challenges they pose to US interests. By analyzing these successes, the article provides valuable insights for policymakers, military strategists, and intelligence officials dealing with similar threats in regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The piece emphasizes the importance of adaptability, innovation, and coordinated efforts across various instruments of national power in effectively countering these shadowy organizations, while also noting the ongoing challenges the US faces in presenting a unified front against such adversaries. This first part sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the topic in the subsequent installment.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular

Autonomous Ghosts are Reshaping Irregular Warfare and Maritime Security

Autonomous Ghosts are Reshaping Irregular Warfare and Maritime Security
by Laurel Baker the 2024 Rising Expert on Geostrategy in the Rising Experts Program at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy in collaboration with the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Project Maritime. Baker works for the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as a National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellow.
 
Laurel Baker explores the emerging threat of unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs) and their profound impact on irregular warfare and international security. Baker examines how these autonomous systems are reshaping naval strategy, challenging traditional maritime force compositions, and complicating the attribution of aggression at sea. She delves into the vulnerabilities of critical underwater infrastructure, particularly undersea cables, and how UMVs could be used for surveillance and sabotage. The piece discusses recent incidents involving UMVs, from Russian mapping operations to Houthi attacks, highlighting the lowered barriers to entry in maritime conflicts. Baker also addresses the legal and operational challenges posed by UMVs, including gaps in maritime law and difficulties in enforcement. The essay concludes by considering the implications for naval powers like the United States, suggesting the need for both defensive and offensive UMV capabilities, as well as regulatory reforms to address this new frontier in maritime security. Throughout, Baker emphasizes the dual nature of UMVs as both potential threats and valuable assets in the evolving landscape of naval warfare.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
 
Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular
 

Uprooting the Enemy: A New Paradigm for Irregular Warfare Analysis

Uprooting the Enemy: A New Paradigm for Irregular Warfare Analysis
by Nicholas Krohley founder of Frontline Advisory. This article and accompanying report are a part of Project SOF in Competition. The report titled Integrated Understanding: Re-Thinking the Human Environment of Military Operations, is the first of the Irregular Warfare Initiative's occasional paper series.
 
Nicholas Krohley argues for the professionalization of analytical approaches in irregular warfare. He contends that while the U.S. has emphasized irregular warfare as an operational activity, it has neglected to develop a robust, systematic understanding of the environments where such warfare occurs. Krohley critiques past analytical shortcomings in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, highlighting how limited frameworks led to strategic failures. He proposes institutionalizing a more comprehensive analytical foundation for irregular warfare, suggesting the development of standardized products like a "Root Map" to better understand adversaries within their operational contexts. This approach, Krohley asserts, would integrate enemy-centric intelligence with broader environmental factors, potentially enhancing the design, execution, and evaluation of irregular warfare campaigns across the competition continuum.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
 
Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular
 
 

Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale
by Beau Chapman, Alexander Suster, and Steven Ahart from the University of Texas Austin's Global Disinformation Lab in collaboration with the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Project Air and Space Power.
 
Burma's military junta, in its desperate bid to maintain power, has embarked on a complex and controversial journey into the world of drone warfare. From ambitious domestic production plans to covert international dealings, the regime's quest for aerial supremacy reveals a stark tale of grandiose dreams colliding with harsh realities. This deeply researched exposé traces the evolution of Burma's drone program, uncovering collaborations with China, Russia, and potentially Iran, while highlighting the junta's pivot to smaller, more practical drone solutions in the face of ongoing civil strife. As the military adapts its tactics, equipping commercial drones with locally manufactured bombs, the piece illuminates not only Burma's internal struggles but also the wider implications for regional stability and global efforts to control drone proliferation. Ultimately, this analysis offers critical insights into the challenges of regulating emerging military technologies and the potential for their misuse by authoritarian regimes.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.
 
Until next time,
 
Keep Warfare Irregular
 

Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning

Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning
In this essay, James P. Micciche, a US Army Strategist, presents a comprehensive framework for improving security cooperation planning and execution in support of U.S. defense strategy. He proposes three interconnected models: one that emphasizes clearly defined objectives tied to policy goals, another that focuses on understanding the operating environment with particular attention to partner nations' capabilities and institutions, and a third that advocates for developing campaigns of integrated, coordinated, and sequenced efforts. Micciche argues that by implementing these models, the United States can better leverage its network of allies and partners as a strategic advantage, aligning with the goals of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The essay underscores the importance of moving beyond discrete security cooperation activities to a more holistic, campaign-oriented approach that maximizes limited resources and accounts for wide-ranging effects in an era of strategic competition.
The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors

 
The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors
This episode explores the often-overlooked legitimacy of violent non-state actors and its implications for international security. We delve into how insurgent groups gain support from local populations and why current approaches to countering them often fall short. Our experts discuss case studies from ISIS to African separatist movements, offering insights on how democracies can more effectively address the root causes of insurgencies in an era of great power competition.
About the Authors:
Santiago Stocker is a Program Director at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and previously served as a Director in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The thoughts expressed in this piece are his own.
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and is a 2024 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint production of Princeton's Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point. The thoughts expressed in this piece are her own.
 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces

By Antonio Salinas
 
The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces
Antonio Salinas offers a unique perspective on the collapse of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Through his "Cacti and Grass" analogy, Salinas illustrates how the U.S. attempted to cultivate a Western-style security force in an environment fundamentally unsuited for such structures. Drawing from his personal experiences and extensive research, Salinas examines the cultural mismatches, strategic oversights, and socio-political realities that contributed to the ANDSF's rapid disintegration. This insightful analysis not only sheds light on the complexities of the Afghanistan conflict but also offers valuable lessons for future foreign security assistance efforts.
 
Antonio Salinas is an active duty Army lieutenant colonel and PhD student in the Department of History at Georgetown University, where he focuses on the history of climate and conflict. Following his coursework, he will teach at the National Intelligence University. Salinas has twenty-five years of military service in the Marine Corps and the United States Army, where he led soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of Siren’s Song: The Allure of War and Boot Camp: The Making of a United States Marine.
 
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
 
If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

Irregular Warfare at Sea: Using Privateers To Seize Chinese Commerce

by Christopher Booth
Editor’s Note I: This article is part of IWI’s Project Maritime, a series exploring the intersection of irregular warfare and the modern maritime dimension. Focusing on current events and their underlying geographical and historical patterns, we aim to contextualize the drivers of conflict in the maritime domain and inspire dialogue on integrated statecraft approaches. We warmly invite your participation and engagement. Please send submissions to Submit An Article with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission.” Follow us @proj_maritime and check out our Project Maritime Look Book.
Editor’s Note II: IWI is pleased to announce Christopher Booth and Walker Mills as the new directors of Project Maritime. Their extensive expertise in irregular warfare, national security, and the maritime domain will significantly enhance our ability to provide unique insights into contemporary maritime challenges. Both Chris and Walker have been non-resident fellows and have written extensively for IWI in the past. We're thrilled to have them join IWI and Project Maritime in leadership roles.
In response to China's growing maritime power and America's naval vulnerabilities, Christoper Booth proposes a controversial solution: reviving privateering. He argues that employing private actors to raid Chinese commerce could provide an asymmetric advantage in a potential long-term conflict, addressing US shipbuilding deficiencies and exploiting China's reliance on maritime trade. Drawing parallels with historical precedents and recent irregular warfare tactics, the essay explores the legal and ethical considerations of privateering while challenging conventional thinking on naval strategy. This provocative proposal aims to spark discussion on innovative approaches to maritime warfare in the 21st century.
About the Author: Christopher D. Booth is a non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative and co-director of Project Maritime. He has more than two decades of experience in national security and international relations, first serving on active duty as an Army armor and cavalry officer. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Command and Staff College–Marine Corps University and graduated from Vanderbilt University Law School and the College of William and Mary.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.